

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0102

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AND GENERAL  
TRUSOV, MARCH 25, 1975 (SALT TWO - 578)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MARCH  
25, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 25, 1975

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO SET FORTH  
CONSIDERATIONS IN SUBSTANTIATION OF SOME OF THE PROVISIONS OF  
THE SOVIET DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND IN THIS CONNECTION  
ALSO TO ADDRESS SOME ASPECTS OF THE DRAFT THE U.S. SIDE  
TABLED ON MARCH 5, 1975.

I

FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT BEING WORKED OUT TO  
HAVE A JURIDICALLY STRICT FORM AND TO AVOID FUTURE MISUNDER-  
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STANDINGS REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS THE SIDES

WILL ASSUME UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, ITS TEXT MUST CONTAIN WORKING WHICH WOULD CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY SPECIFY IN WHAT ACTUAL STATUS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WILL BECOME SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED.

THIS QUESTION WAS ALREADY IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE SIDES DURING PREPARATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN FORCE, AND APPROPRIATE AGREED PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE ARMS LIMITED UNDER THAT DOCUMENT ARE CONTAINED INT ITS ARTICLE III. THE EXPERIENCE ACCUMULATED SINCE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT HAS CONFIRMED THE VIABILITY OF THE PROVISIONS ADOPTED THEREIN.

IT FOLLOWS FROM A COMPARISON OF THE TEXTS OF THE SOVIET AND U.S. DRAFTS THAT BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF THE SYSTEMS BEING LIMITED MUST ALSO BE RESOLVED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985, WHICH IS IN PREPARATION.

IN THE SOVIET DRAFT THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS ARE CONCENTRATED IN ARTICLE VI.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBPARAGRAPH A OF THAT ARTICLE, THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED WOULD APPLY TO ARMAMENTS THAT ARE OPERATIONAL. ARTICLE III, SUBPARAGRAPH 2A(1) OF THE U.S. DRAFT ALSO DEALS WITH COUNTING OPERATIONAL FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS IN THE LIMITS BEING ESTABLISHED. IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, IT MAKES SENSE TO APPLY THE PROVISION "OPERATIONAL" NOT TO JUST ANY SINGLE TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, BUT TO ALL OPERATIONAL ARMS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THIS UNDERSTANDING.

IN THE COURSE OF MY EXPOSITION I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING. IN ADDITION TO OPERATIONAL LAUNCHERS, THE AFOREMENTIONED PROVISION OF THE U.S. DRAFT ALSO INCLUDES AMONG THE FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS TO BE COUNTED, SUCH LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. COULDN'T THE U.S. SIDE CLARIFY WHAT CONSTRUCTION IT HAS IN MIND?

NEXT. ARTICLE VI, SUBPARAGRAPH B, OF THE SOVIET DRAFT STATES  
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THAT THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE NEW AGREEMENT ALSO APPLY TO ARMAMENTS PLACED IN RESERVE OR MOTHBALLED. THIS PROVISION WOULD, OF COURSE, ALSO APPLY TO ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE USSR DELEGATION NOTES THAT THE WORDING OF ARTICLE VI, SUBPARAGRAPH B, OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, AND THAT OF ARTICLE III, SUBPARAGRAPH 2B(2), OF THE U.S. DRAFT ARE VERY SIMILAR AND CAN SERVE AS A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT AN APPROPRIATE AGREED PROVISION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT

OF THE NEW AGREEMENT UNDER PREPARATION.

ARTICLE VI, SUBPARAGRAPH C OF THE SOVIET DRAFT DEALS WITH APPLYING THE LIMITATIONS BEING PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT TO STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH ARE IN THE FINAL STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION, UNDER REPAIR OR BEING MODERNIZED. THIS WORDING IS ALSO OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATURE. IN PROPOSING TO INCLUDE IT IN THE TEXT OF THE JOINT DRAFT BEING WORKED OUT, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST PROVIDE FOR APPLYING THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN TO ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AT A CERTAIN STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION, AND NOT JUST TO SOME INDIVIDUAL TYPES THEREOF. AT THE SAME TIME, IN VIEW OF THE ACTUAL PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE RELEVANT PROVISION MUST CLEARLY DEFINE PRECISELY WHAT STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION IS MEANT. PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON THE SOVIET DRAFT PROVIDES THAT LIMITATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST APPLY TO ARMAMENTS "IN THE FINAL STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION."

WE ALSO NOTE THAT THE PROVISION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE III, SUBPARAGRAPH 2A(3) OF THE U.S. DRAFT, WHICH DEALS WITH COUNTING SLBM LAUNCHERS WITHIN THE LIMITS BEING ESTABLISHED WHEN THE SUBMARINE CARRYING SUCH SLBM LAUNCHERS BEINGS SEA TRIALS, CORRESPONDS TO THE USSR DELEGATION'S UNDERSTANDING OF THIS QUESTION. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE CORRESPONDING FORMULA CONTAINED IN THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, COULD BE RETAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT AS WELL.

ARTICLE VI, SUBPARAGRAPH C, OF THE SOVIET DRAFT REFLECTS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ARMAMENTS UNDER REPAIR, REGARDLESS  
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OF THE SCOPE AND TYPES OF REPAIR, MUST BE CONSIDERED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF LIMITATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. BEGIN BRACKETS  
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: THIS WORDING IS INTENDED TO INCLUDE REPAIR AND OVERHAUL. END BRACKETS

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE WORDING OF THESE PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT FULLY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE PROVISION TO BE RECORDED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT REGARDING MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THERE ARE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.

THE USSR DELEGATION NOTES THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN PROXIMITY BETWEEN THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI, SUBPARAGRAPH C, OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AND THE WORDING OF ARTICLE III, SUBPARAGRAPH

2B(1) OF THE U.S. DRAFT.

PROCEEDING FROM THE ABOVE, THE USSR DELEGATION PROPOSES THAT THE QUESTION OF WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE FOR THE PROBLEMS TOUCHED UPON IN ARTICLE VI OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AND THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. DRAFT, BE CONSIDERED IN THE WORKING GROUP ENGAGED IN PREPARING THE JOINT TEXT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO LEARN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSAL.

## II

IN STATEMENTS ON FEBRUARY 1, 4 AND 18, AS WELL AS ON MARCH 4, 10, 14 AND 21, THE USSR DELEGATION ADDRESSED THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, WHICH PROVIDES FOR AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN VIEW OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE CORRESPONDING PROHIBITIONS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE SIDES EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE USSR DELEGATION TODAY WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT A NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROVISIONS OF SUBPARAGRAPHS E AND F OF THAT ARTICLE.

ACCORDING TO ARTICLE IX, SUBPARAGRAPH E, OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, THE SIDES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY SYSTEMS FOR SECRET

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PLACING IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KINDS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

ASSUMPTION OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE JOINTLY EXPRESSED INTEREST OF THE SIDES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE USE OF OUTER SPACE MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD THE BENEFIT OF ALL PEOPLES, AS SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, SIGNED IN JANUARY 1967. BANNING UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER KINDS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH WOULD GIVE DUE CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO THE EXISTING OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES IN THIS FIELD, AND WOULD BE IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

ARTICLE IX, SUBPARAGRAPH F OF THE SOVIET DRAFT PROVIDES FOR AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.

AS YOU KNOW, SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEM-

BER 10, 1974 SPECIFIES THAT "EACH PARTY WILL BE LIMITED TO NO MORE THAN 1,320 ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES."

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THIS PROVISION, WHICH CONSTITUTES CLEAR GUIDANCE FOR WORKING OUT A JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT FOR BOTH DELEGATIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, CONTAINS AN ACCURATE AND UNAMBIGUOUS UNDERSTANDING OF PRECISELY WHICH MISSILE MAY BE QUIPPED WITH MIRVS, NATURALLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AFOREMENTIONED LIMITATIONS.

TAKING THIS UNDERSTANDING INTO ACCOUNT, THE AGREEMENT MUST OBVIOUSLY INCORPORATE PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE ITS CIRCUMVENTION BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON OTHER TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

BANNING MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES IS WHILLY IN ACCORD WITH THAT OBJECTIVE. IT WOULD PREVENT EXPANSION OF THE AREAS OF APPLICATION OF MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES, AND WOULD

THEREBY BLOCK A CHANNEL FOR POSSIBLE COMPETITION IN THIS NEW FIELD OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON THIS QUESTION, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX, WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND WOULD HELP MAINTAIN STRATEGIC STABILITY, WHICH WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES IN EQUAL MEASURE.

AND, CONVERSELY, THE DIFFERENT SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF MIRVED AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, INCORPORATED IN ARTICLE IV OF THE U.S. DRAFT, IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF FINDING THE MOST EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO THIS QUESTION, AS AGREED AND RECORDED IN SUBPARAGRAPH 2(C) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX, SUBPARAGRAPHS E AND F, OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, JUST AS ALL THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THAT ARTICLE, WHICH WE DISCUSSED AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS, ARE BASED ON THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EUQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND ENSUE FROM THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., ACHIEVED AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VLADIVOSTOK.

### III

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ALREADY ADDRESSED SOME PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE IV OF THE U.S. DRAFT, AT THE MARCH 21 MEETING.

TODAY WE WOULD LIKE TO CITE SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DEMONSTRATING THAT THE CONTENT OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE U.S. DRAFT DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES.

AS WE HAVE ALREADY NOTED, THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN SUBPARAGRAPH 1(A) OF THE PROTOCOL, TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHICH WAS INITIATED AFTER JULY 1, 1970, REGARDLESS OF HOW THE MISSILES CONTAINED THEREIN ARE EQUIPPED, ARE COUNTED WITHIN THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS WITH MIRVED MISSILES, WOULD ACTUALLY MEAN EITHER THAT LAUNCHERS WITH MIRVED MISSILES, AS WELL AS THOSE WITH MISSILES WITHOUT SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES, WOULD BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 1,320 UNITS, OR ELSE THAT THE SIDES WOULD NOT BE FREE

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IN THEIR SELECTION OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES WHICH THEY COULD DEPLOY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE AGREED AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 2,400 UNITS. THE U.S. SIDE HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY SUBSTANTIATED REBUTTALS TO THIS STATEMENT OF OURS. AND THIS IS NOT ACCIDENTAL, FOR IT IS INDISPUTABLE, BOTH FROM A FACTUAL AND A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

THE SAME ALSO APPLIES TO THE PROVISION OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH CONCERNS CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR NON-MIRVED MISSILES INTO LAUNCHERS FOR MIRVED MISSILES.

IN PRACTICE, ADOPTION OF SUCH A PROVISION WOULD MEAN EITHER THAT LAUNCHERS FOR NON-MIRVED MISSILES WOULD BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 1,320 UNITS, OR ELSE THAT A SIDE WOULD BE LIMITED WITH RESPECT TO MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AND EVEN STATING THE QUESTION IN THESE TERMS TESTIFIES TO THE FACT THAT THE LIMITATION PROPOSED IS UNFOUNDED AND PURSUES UNILATERAL OBJECTIVES.

AND, OF COURSE, IT IS CLEAR THAT ONE CANNOT AGREE WITH THE PROVISION OF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL, UNDER WHICH THE LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS WITH MIRVED MISSILES WOULD LEAD TO SOME KIND OF LIMITATIONS ON THE MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF OTHER MISSILES OR LAUNCHERS THEREFOR.

MR. AMBASSADOR,  
SUBSEQUENTLY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO CONTINUE SETTING FORTH CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE U.S. DRAFT, ALONG WITH THE RATIONALE FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT.  
UNQUOTE

QUOTE

TRUSOV STATEMENT, MARCH 25, 1975

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON INCREASING THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, THE AGREED INTERPRETATION AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF MAY 26, 1972, CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON INCREASING THE DIMENSIONS OF SUCH LAUNCHERS BY NO MORE THAN 10-15 PER CENT, COULD BE RECORDED IN THE FORM OF AN  
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APPROPRIATE AGREED STATEMENT BY THE SIDES.

WE ALSO NOTED THAT THE STATEMENT BY THE U.S. DELEGATION OF FEBRUARY 10, 1975, SAID THAT "THE AGREED INTERPRETATION AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING DATED MAY 26, 1972, RELATING TO LIMITATIONS ON

INCREASES IN THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WILL ALSO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT."

THIS IS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ESSENCE OF THE QUESTION, WHICH IS IN ACCORD WITH THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974.

THE U.S. PROPOSALS OF MARCH 5, 1975, HOWEVER, RADICALLY DIFFER FROM SUCH AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING.

THERE IS NO NEED TO EXPLAIN THAT THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING OF MAY 26, 1972, WHICH IS RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, APPLIES TO THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM SILO LAUNCHERS, AND NOT TO ONE OF THOSE DIMENSIONS--DEPTH OR DIAMETER.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE ALSO THAT 15 PERCENT CHANGES IN DEPTH OR DIAMETER ARE NOT EQUIVALENT TO EACH OTHER.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, WE WOULD LIKE TO UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC OF THE U.S. DELEGATION'S ARGUMENTS AND HOW THE PROPOSALS ON THIS QUESTION, TABLE BY THE U.S. DELEGATION IN MARCH 1975, CORRESPOND TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN OUR STATES.  
UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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